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Abstract 
Access control models are implemented to mitigate the risks of unauthorized access in Electronic Health 
Records (EHRs). These models provide authorization with the help of security policies, wherein the 
protected resource is governed by one or more policies that exactly specify what attributes a requester 
needs to fulfill in order to obtain access. However, due to the increasing complexity of current healthcare 
system, defining and implementing policies are becoming more and more difficult. In this research-in-
progress paper, we present an Activity Theory driven methodology to formalize access control policies 
that can be used in enforcing patient’s privacy consent in a healthcare setting. In order to account for the 
transitivity in health workflows, we extend the Activity Theory to include “organizational 
interconnectedness” within the health workflows.  
Keywords 
Activity Theory, Organizational Interconnectedness, Electronic Healthcare Records, Transitive Health 
Workflows, Access Control Policy, Policy Specification, Policy Formalization, XACML Policies 
Introduction  
Governments and institutions have started to recognize the importance of the exchange of Electronic 
Health Records (EHRs) between hospitals. This exchange process is regulated by the patients, who decide 
who has the rights to access their personal healthcare data and who has not. In order to mitigate the risks 
of unauthorized access in Electronic Health Records (EHRs), access control models are implemented to 
safeguard patient’s privacy consent. One such type of model that requires establishing security policies to 
ensure users can only access what they are authorized to (Busch et al., 2012) is Policy Based Access 
Control (PBAC) model, wherein a protected resource is governed by one or more policies that specify what 
attributes a requester needs to fulfill in order to obtain access (Margheri et al., 2013a).  
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However, defining and implementing access control policies has become increasingly difficult (Margheri 
et al., 2013b) owing to the complexities of the healthcare systems: 1) patient workflows are growing 
transitive in nature, as the data flows from one point to the other in the workflow (Valecha et al., 2012); 2) 
privacy consent is becoming intricate due to the regulations by multiple legislations that vary from region 
to region; 3) technology to meet patient’s needs is fragmented. As a solution to this problem, we provide a 
theory-driven methodology to enable the formalization of access control policies. 
The healthcare workflow consists of complex activities typically involving multiple agencies. Shanker et al. 
(2009) suggest that Activity Theory can be used to simplify the complex workflows.  Activity Theory is a 
powerful and clarifying descriptive tool with the objective to understand the activity (Nardi, 1995). It gives 
the flexibility of breaking up complex tasks into activities that are easy to interpret and manage. 
Consequently, we use Activity Theory as a lens to deconstruct the complex activities in the health 
workflow, and then develop our framework to enforce patient’s privacy consent in a complex healthcare 
setting with an aim to address the research question: how to clearly define and implement access control 
policies in a transitive healthcare workflow?  
Our contributions are two-fold: First, we extend Activity Theory to include “organizational 
interconnectedness” in a transitive health workflow. Second, we present a novel methodology to formalize 
the access control policies based on the extended Activity Theory. We specify the authorized policies in 
eXtensible Access Control Modeling Language (XACML) since it is the de-facto standard used in EHRs 
systems (De la Rosa Algarin et al., 2012). Our paper adheres to the design science research guidelines 
proposed by Hevner et al. (2004) and others (Peffers et al. 2003; Purao et al. 2008): the research 
contributes to the policy-based access control literature using an Activity Theory approach.  
In the remainder of this paper, we first examine the existing literature on healthcare access control and 
Activity Theory. We then present the policy specification design consideration followed by the new policy 
specification methodology. Finally, we discuss the paper’s implications and limitations, and suggest 
directions for future research. 
Background 
In this section, we discuss some of the current access control models including access control lists, role-
based access control, attribute-based access control and policy-based access control. Subsequently we 
introduce Activity Theory and discuss its potential in helping us elicit and understand the requirements in 
the policy specification process.  
Access Control 
Access Control Lists (ACLs) are the oldest and the simplest form of access control wherein each resource 
on a system has its own list of mappings between the set of requesting entities and their set of actions 
(Nita-Rotaru & Li, 2004). ACLs are difficult to manage in an enterprise setting, in which the user has 
different levels of access to different resources, since adding, deleting and updating ACLs can be time-
consuming and error-prone (Ferraiolo et al., 2003). Role-based Access Control (RBAC) is an alternative 
access control model in which access to a resource is determined based on the role of the requester 
(Sandhu et al., 1996). One of the disadvantages of RBAC is that dividing people into role categories makes 
defining granular access controls for each person cumbersome (Azhar et al., 2012). The Attribute-based 
Access Control (ABAC) model was designed to fulfill this requirement.  
ABAC is an access control model wherein the access control decisions are made based on a set of 
attributes, associated with the requester, the environment, and the resource itself (Goyal et al., 2006). 
One limitation of the ABAC model is that in an enterprise setting with many resources, individuals, and 
applications, there can be disparate attributes and access control mechanisms (Reddivari et al., 2005). 
Policy-based Access Control (PBAC) enables organizations to have a more uniform access control model 
throughout the organization. Many organizations are discovering that they need to create and enforce 
policies that define who should have access to what resources, and in what environment. The eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) was developed as a way to specify access control policy in a 
machine-readable format (Anderson et al., 2003). 
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XACML-based Access Control 
Access control is the process of mediating request to data, and determining if the request should be 
granted or denied. A typical access control model includes three main entities – subject, resource and 
action – a subject requests an action on a resource. In the healthcare setting, access control is the process 
of authorization in which the access to medical records can be limited only to users with an appropriate 
role and the access can be allowed only during an episode of care (Milutinovic, 2008). 
Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) (Anderson et al., 2003) is a standard that 
describes a policy in terms of request/response (written in XML). It defines an access control policy by 
providing features to express policy rules for resources in XML (Busch et al., 2012). The typical setup 
involves a subject requesting an action on a resource in the form of request for that resource. This request 
also includes the environment within which the action is to be performed. All the elements of the request 
have their own attributes, which are named values of known types. Specifically, attributes are 
characteristics of the subject, resource, action or environment in which the access request is made 
(Sanchez et al., 2008). For example, a user’s name, their security clearance, the file they want to access, 
and the time of the day are attribute values for subject, action, resource and environment respectively. 
This request forms a query that is evaluated to determine whether the action should be allowed. The 
response is an expression about whether the request should be permitted or denied. 
In order to derive these attributes within a healthcare setting, it is important to first deconstruct the 
transitive health workflows. Activity Theory can be used to simplify the complex workflows (Shanker et 
al., 2009). We discuss the use of Activity Theory in formalizing the access control policies next. 
Activity Theory 
Activity Theory is a framework that provides a lens to analyze the activity of a group or an organization 
(Chaudhury et al., 2001). It considers an activity consisting of six major elements: subject, object and 
community supported by tools, rules and division of labor. It suggests that an activity is directed towards 
an object, mediated by the instrument and socially constituted within the environment (Bertelsen and 
Bodker, 2003). The subject is the individual or the group performing the activity supported by 
instruments on the object that can be either an ideal or a material object (Valecha et al., 2012). This 
interaction between the subject and object is confined within the environment consisting of rules, 
responsibilities and communities (Chen et al., 2013). Engestrom (1999) extends the concept of Activity 
Theory, and gives a specific example of its usage in a hospital setting where a doctor performs a diagnosis 
on a patient. In this diagnosis activity, the subject is the physician, the object is the patient, and the 
activity is supported by the instruments such as stethoscope. The community in which the activity is 
placed is the physician and nurse, with constraints of patient authorization before disclosure to any entity, 
and responsibility of assisting the patient. 
The healthcare system is a complex system that involves transitive workflows, intricate legislations and 
ever-expanding technology. The principal components (e.g., subject) of the healthcare workflow change 
depending on the circumstances, and their relationships within the environment undergo frequent 
restructuration. We apply Activity Theory to investigate healthcare systems along dimensions of an 
activity system: subject, activity, instrument, community, rule, and division of labor. This allows us to 
obtain an in-depth understanding of the healthcare setting, which allows us to comprehend the business 
requirements of access control policy and to recognize the key data elements that policy designers will 
value and will communicate during the data flow. In our study, we capture all of these key data elements 
and their interactions in our policy. 
To formalize access control policies in a healthcare setting, we need to consider the transitivity within its 
workflows. Consequently, we extend Activity Theory. We start with the traditional formalisms of Activity 
Theory (Engestrom 1987), and then consider “organizational interconnectedness” as an important 
perspective. Our analyses of organizational interconnectedness between activity systems allow us to 
observe the data flow from one organization to the other, and to capture important data elements. Boer et 
al. (2002) studied “temporal interconnectedness” among multiple heterogeneous activity systems and 
Chen et al. (2013) investigated “temporal interconnectedness” within the activity system. While these 
studies consider transition from one activity system to another over a time sequence, we consider this 
transition over an organization sequence. The organization sequence reveals the pattern of information 
flow in the health workflow. 
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We argue that this organization sequence is inherent to the healthcare activities and affects the major 
constructs in Activity Theory. In health workflow system, there are different roles within the organization 
that do not cross the organizational boundaries. For example, an administrative role in a hospital provides 
read/write permission to patient’s health condition, while an administrative role in an insurance agency 
provides read/write permission to patient’s claims data. This results in role conflicts between the 
organizations.  The organizational interconnectedness provides a higher level of abstraction that allows us 
to address conflicts that arise because of boundary transitions.  
We also suggest that “feedback” in the form of request/response may exist between the organizations in a 
transitive workflow. Feedback is an implied part of Activity Theory (Foorthuis et al. 2008) that might 
exist among heterogeneous activity systems (Zhang and Bai 2005). Based on the existing literature, we 
recognize the potential effects of feedback in driving the development of our multi-organization activity 
system. The concepts of organizational interconnectedness and feedback are illustrated in Figure 1.  
The data in a transitive health workflow passes between four types of organizations: providers, payers, 
purchasers and members. The Provider activity system consists of physicians, nurses, hospitals, and 
others that provide medical services. The Payer activity system includes employers, federal government, 
insurance companies, health plans, or other entities that is liable for healthcare coverage for plan 
members. The Purchaser activity system involves persons or organizations that actually pay the premiums 
for the healthcare plan. The Member activity system considers enrolled population of individuals for 
which a health plan provides a range of healthcare services. While the components (e.g., subjects, objects, 
rules) of the activity system sharply differ, they share portions of task-critical data (e.g., community, tool, 
responsibility) that can be incorporated into access control policies. We used XACML to specify and 
record the access control model. Where the organizations are concerned, XACML-based specification 
allows the platform-interdependent utilization of the development of automated authorization tools.  
 
 
Figure 1. Organizational Interconnectedness in Health Workflow 
 
Design Consideration for Policy Specification  
In order to use Activity Theory to specify policy, first it is important to understand the elements of the 
policy and how they interact with each other. Thus in this section we detail the access control policies and 
access requests. 
The basic element of the policy is <Policy>. A <Policy> is composed of a <Target>, which identifies the set 
of attributes that the requester must expose, <Obligation>, which determines the set of actions the user is 
obligated to perform, and <Rule>, which specifies the logic for access control decision by means of an 
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Effect, which can be either Permit or Deny. These elements are described in Table 1 below. A <Rule> may 
specify a <Target> and a <Condition> of its own, a combination of standard-defined functions that 
operate on values coming from the request (Busch et al., 2012). 
A policy specifies of four elements within its target: <Subjects>, <Actions>, <Resources>, and 
<Environments>, each of which contains an attribute identifier, a value and a matching function. 
Together this information is used to check whether the policy is applicable to a given request. For 
example, a physician trying to request a read access to a resource with a code identifier 34133-9 for a 
healthcare TREATMENT. The matching function retrieves a value from the request and matches it with 
the values specified in the target element, according to the function’s semantics. If, for all four categories, 
the matching of a target element succeeds, then the policy is applicable to the request (Margheri et al., 
2013b). This is summarized in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Policy Model 
 
Table 1. Policy Elements 
Entity Description 
 
Access Control Policy 
 
Obligation A set of actions that is bound for the 
request  
Rule A set of conditions that the request has 
to satisfy 
Target A set of attributes (subject, resource, 
action, environment) that the request 
has to consist  
Access Control Target 
 
Subject The user requesting the access to the 
resource 
Resource The entity (patient data) being 
protected 
Action The operation to be performed on the 
resource 
Environment The setting in which the resource 
resides 
  
 
Activity Theory Based Policy Specification 
In this section, we elicit our Activity Theory approach to specify access control policy specification. An 
access control policy is composed of components in security systems and interactions among them 
(Huang & Kirchner, 2011). So the next step is to identify which aspects of an Activity Theory based 
analysis can help us to capture a view of access control policy that should be incorporated in the patient’s 
privacy consent. This access control policy should include the acting subjects, the objects towards which 
activities are directed and the community as well as the mediating components, like rules or tools. 
In an access control model, subject performs the activity of requesting access. The resource transformed 
by the access is a data or service. The obligation is the operation that is performed for enforcement of the 
authorization. The environment component is intended to specify aspects of the external environment 
and other additional information. The rules specify the logic for the access control decision by means of an 
effect. The action defines the type of access requested on the object. Thus, we propose a mapping from the 
basic structure of an activity into policy model of access control as depicted in Figure 3.  
It is important to point out that we do not think that a strict, one to one mapping exists. Our view on 
access control policy is that different interpretations exist. For example, that what is considered 
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environmental information in one setting can be part of the rule in another setting. Likewise, the same 
piece of information can be part of different categories based on the task. The same holds for the Activity 
Theory based analysis itself: the same thing can be an object and a tool in different task settings. The 
mapping from activity system to policy system suggests that Activity Theory should lead the policy 
specification process and allow the designer to focus on task-related information instead of being lost in 
the modeling of policy details without being able to see the relationship between different aspects of the 
policy system (Kofod-Petersen & Cassens, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 3. Activity Theory based Specification of Access Control Policy 
 
 
Case Study 
Let us now consider a hospital setting where a physician is requesting a read access to patient’s medical 
records. The physician is the subject in the process, who is a part of the hospital community together with 
other stake-holders, each of whom has read, write or other responsibility of their own. The object at hand 
is patient’s medical record, which has to be accessed by the physician. The task of accessing the record is 
governed by a set of rules, some explicit like access method and some implicit like hospital standards. The 
physician uses a set of obligations (tools) to gain the access, like an over-the-network login. 
When we design a policy specification for the support of the above task, we include information about the 
physician in the <Subject> element, about the hospital setting in the <Environment>, aspects regarding 
the patient’s medical record in the <Resource> element, and regarding the read responsibility towards the 
resource in the <Action> element of the <Target>. The conditions are part of the <Rule> element, and the 
tools are a part of the <Obligation> element of the <Policy>. Since they are not made visible in this 
scenario, they are not included in the policy specification. 
Next, we design policy specification for the “organizational interconnectedness” within the workflow. 
Consider as an example, a physician is requesting a read access to patient’s diagnosis from the researcher 
in the laboratories. The physician and the researcher are the subjects in the process, within the hospital 
and the research lab community, each of whom has access rights of their own. The object at hand is 
patient’s diagnosis. Activity Theory allows to break down the workflow into separate activity systems. 
Each activity system is specified as detailed previously. The policies for each activity system are evaluated 
within its organization in the workflow. The overall outcome of the workflow is based the outcome of each 
of the two activity systems. If both policies are met then the diagnosis data flow is successful.  
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Table 2.  Case Application 
Authorization Process Mapping Activity System to Policy System XACML Policy – Transitive Workflow 
Activity System Data Policy System 
 
 
 
Physician can read/write 
patient data in hospital 
setting 
 
 
 
 
 
Subject 
Object 
Responsibility 
Community 
 
 
Physician 
Patient data 
Read 
Hospital 
 
 
Subject 
Resource 
Action 
Environment 
<Policy id=”Workflow”> 
<Policy id=”Activity”> 
<Target> 
<Subject>Physician</Subject> 
<Resource>Patient Data</Resource> 
<Action>Read</Action> 
<Environment>Hospital</Environment> 
</Target> 
</Policy> 
<Policy id=”Activity”> 
<Target> 
<Subject>Underwriter</Subject> 
<Resource>Patients Data</Resource> 
<Action>Read</Action> 
<Environment>Insurer</Environment> 
</Target> 
</Policy> 
</Policy 
 
 
 
Underwriting agent  can 
read patient data in 
insurance setting 
 
 
Subject 
Object 
Responsibility 
Community 
 
 
Underwriter 
Patient data  
Read 
Insurer 
 
 
Subject 
Resource 
Action 
Environment 
 
Conclusion 
Access control models safeguard patient’s privacy consent by mitigating the risks of unauthorized access. 
In this model, a resource is governed by one or more policies that specify attributes required for obtaining 
access. However, the complexity of the healthcare system owing to the transitive nature of health 
workflows has made it difficult to define and implement access control policies. As a solution to this 
problem, in this paper, we provide a theory-driven methodology to enable the formalization of access 
control policies. 
We have seen that Activity Theory is helpful for understanding the authorization process. Besides, it is an 
effective guide for the implementation of the policy and paves the way for the development of analysis 
tasks. The components of Activity Theory directly maps onto the policy model. Activity Theory therefore 
constitutes a perfect framework which underpins access control policy specification. The findings lead to 
the proposal of Activity Theory being adopted as a framework which underpins patient’s privacy consent 
in hospitals and other healthcare institutions. 
In this research-in-progress paper, we focus on patient’s privacy consent in a complex healthcare setting, 
and address the research question: how to clearly define and implement access control policies in a 
transitive healthcare workflow? We extend Activity Theory to include “organizational interconnectedness” 
within transitive workflow, and propose a methodology for specifying access control policies. This paper 
therefore is a step in understanding the patient’s privacy consent and authorization in complex situations. 
We also suggest implications for policy designers to better specify access control policies by analyzing the 
security components and their interactions.  
Our methodology can be extended in multiple ways: We believe that our methodology can help develop 
solutions that facilitate secure sharing of electronic health records. Furthermore, our adaptation of 
Activity Theory to include organizational interconnectedness can also be applied to other inter-
organizational settings that involve the flow of information from one organization to the other. Our paper 
has limitation in that we focus only on XACML standard for policy specification.  
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